Aso shows you how to abdicate (反面教材)


See Japan Probe for translation, and other election ads in Japan.


China's Policy in Border Disputes (i)

A few months ago Professor Fravel of MIT published a rather thorough study examining how China (since 1949, PRC) has handled its border disputes, and also some insight into forecasting its future behavior in border disputes, in a view to also shedding light to how states handle border disputes in general.

Foreign Affairs had a short book reviews in its April issue.

The publisher (Princeton Univeristy Press) has provided the introductory section for a free preview.

Prof Fravel has adopted a methodology which begins his analysis by defining the issues related to Taiwan and even HK/Macau as border disputes, which PRC has already put itself into a position that they are of a fundamentally different nature. Nevertheless, it appears Prof Fravel, beginning with a white sheet, has reached a conclusion which would be consistent with the alternative approach.

Boston.com has an interview (see below) with the author (by Harvard Crimson/Boston Globe), providing some insights into the Taiwan issue (which I largely agree). In particular, Prof Fravel discussed his view on the likelihood of a war related to territory (Taiwan is perhaps the only likely source as we all know), and dispelled the myth that China may launch a "diversionary war" (and perhaps diversionary wars in general in the world!). Prof Fravel believes, to the contrary, China is likely to make concession when there is internal pressure!

I have yet to acquire a copy of the book. But there are enough materials from PUP's introductory section which I hope to comment on in the next post.

Fig (click to enlarge): The border demarcated in 1960s with DPRK, shows the concession China yielded to North Korea, essentially giving up almost all the islands along Yalu River. (source)


A talk with M. Taylor Fravel

An MIT scholar asks: What would make China use its army?

By Samuel P. Jacobs
August 10, 2008

AS THE WORLD'S attention focuses on China's first-ever Olympics, the country is staging a glossy, upbeat show of hospitality. But behind that surface of prosperity and welcome, China's government remains a secretive regime immensely preoccupied with its own security. Leaders worry about the country's vast borders and restive minority populations, threatened by resistance from groups in the western province of Xinjiang, by calls for Tibetan autonomy, and the persistent diplomatic standoff with Taiwan.

(Pat Greenhouse/Globe Staff)
In his new book, M. Taylor Fravel offers an intriguing argument about the relationship between instability within China and stability in the rest of the world.
The instrument for enforcing all this is China's military, the largest in the world - 2.3 million people - and one of a handful with the capacity to launch nuclear weapons. How, and when, China uses its military power is a serious concern in Asia and beyond, and one that will endure long after the Olympic torch has exited Beijing.

M. Taylor Fravel, a member of MIT's political science department and security studies program, has made a career of studying how, and when, China uses force. The 37-year-old professor, who spent two years of high school living in Taiwan, has combed through newly available documents from China's military academies and strategic thinkers. He has also examined nearly two dozen territorial disputes between China and its neighbors over the last six decades.

In a book to be published next month by Princeton University Press, "Strong Borders, Secure Nation," Fravel explains how China uses its military to protect the security of the ruling party, preserve the country's territorial integrity, police a 14,000-mile border that touches 14 countries, and keep Taiwan in check. He also offers an intriguing argument about the relationship between instability within China and stability in the rest of the world.

Ideas spoke with Fravel by phone and in his Cambridge office.

IDEAS: The focus of your upcoming book and much of your scholarship on China is on territorial disputes. Why study them?

FRAVEL: States have fought over territory more than any other issue. . . . The real question that is on many people's minds with respect to China is whether China will become a country that is highly likely to use force in resolving its international disputes. Territorial disputes provide one way to answer that question.

IDEAS: So how likely is China to use force?

FRAVEL: If you look at all of China's territorial disputes, you see that it's not especially prone to use force in these conflicts. One can tentatively infer from that that China is not necessarily highly prone to use force over other issues.

IDEAS: What would provoke China?

FRAVEL: The one specific issue - this is not terribly surprising at all - where China would use force under certain circumstances would be over Taiwan.

IDEAS: What would a Chinese attack on Taiwan look like?

FRAVEL: It depends on the political goal that China is trying to achieve. . . . The scenarios that are commonly discussed are a circle blockade of the island, which would be more of an effort to coerce Taiwan without engaging in direct armed combat. Another scenario is what is referred to as a decapitation strike, an effort to remove three-fourths of the leadership of Taiwan. A third scenario would be an amphibious assault on the island. However, many people view that as unlikely because amphibious assaults are hard to execute successfully. It would require probably more capability than China has.

(Pat Greenhouse/Globe Staff)
In his new book, M. Taylor Fravel offers an intriguing argument about the relationship between instability within China and stability in the rest of the world.
However force might be used across the Taiwan Strait, two points should be made. The first is that the use of force would be linked to some political goal, most likely preventing the island from completing what the mainland believes are important steps for the island to achieve political independence. . . . Second, if China were to use force across the Taiwan Strait, it would most likely try to limit conflict with United States.

IDEAS: What would the American response be like?

FRAVEL: If China used force across the Taiwan Strait? It would be a major crisis. . . . I don't think it would be a question of if the US would respond; the question would be how.

IDEAS: You challenge the accepted theory that China might launch a war to divert the attention of its population.

FRAVEL: The "diversionary war" argument posits that when leaders face threats to their political power at home, they are more likely to initiate or escalate a crisis abroad to divert attention of a dissatisfied public and rally society around the flag. What I found . . . is that when faced with ethnic unrest or legitimacy crises, the Chinese government has been more likely to cooperate in its territorial disputes in exchange for assistance in a domestic political problem that it faces.

A recent example of this would be China's efforts to compromise with neighbors in Central Asia in the 1990s over a range of disputed territories at precisely the time when Xinjiang, the Chinese autonomous region adjacent to the Central Asian republics, was experiencing a high degree of ethnic unrest. . . . China, I argue, traded concessions in the territorial disputes for assistance in improving border security, cracking down on dissident groups that were operating in areas neighboring China.

IDEAS: Are there examples of these "diversionary wars" from other countries?

FRAVEL: The paradigmatic case that many scholars cite is Argentina's decision to invade the Falkland Islands in 1982. . . . According to one theory, Argentina invades the Falklands to distract its dissatisfied population from internal difficulties and unite the country around a nationalist goal of unifying the islands.

IDEAS: What do your findings suggest for US policy toward China?

FRAVEL: China is not as prone to what we might call muscle-flexing as the increasing prominence of nationalism and patriotism might suggest.

IDEAS: What are some other American misperceptions about China?

FRAVEL: The challenge of governing China from the leadership perspective should not be underestimated. You've got approximately one-fifth of the world's population in an area roughly the size of the United States with perhaps as much cultural diversity as Western and Eastern Europe combined. . . . Just keeping the state together, much less growing at a rapid clip, such that you don't have a major episode of civil unrest or ethnic unrest, is a daunting political and administrative undertaking.

IDEAS: So the busier the Chinese are taking care of their affairs within the country, the less we have to worry about them?

FRAVEL: I'm not sure I would quite say that. If the majority of American attention looks at China's potential in the world, I would say that the majority of the leadership's attention in China is focused internally.

Samuel P. Jacobs is a senior at Harvard College and associate managing editor of The Harvard Crimson.


The 15 movies that stick with me

Here are the 15 movies that I would still remember vividly years after watching -- in order

1. Casablanca (1942) (La marseilles vs Die Wacht am Rhein)
2. Oldboy (2003)
3. Battleship Potemkin Bronenosets Potyomkin (1925) (Odessa steps, and its descendants)
4. Mulholland Dr. (2001) (Teaser: I've told every little star)
5. Pulp Fiction (1994)
6. City on Fire Lung fu fong wan (1987) 龍虎風雲 (this started Taratino's career)
7. Red Sorghum Hong gao liang (1987) 紅高粱
8. The Cook the Thief His Wife & Her Lover (1989)
9. Devils on the Doorstep Guizi lai le (2000) 鬼子來了
10. As Tears Go By Wong gok ka moon (1988) 旺角卡門 (i only just learned of this alternative ending)
11. Blade Runner (1982)
12. Bicycle Thief Ladri di biciclette (1948)
13. Leon - the professional Léon (1994)
14. A Tale of Tales Skazka skazok (1979) (this short animation is available on youtube in 3 parts)
15. Vertigo (1958)

Of course, 15 is quite an artificial cut-off. there are more (after the 15 above):
Nabbeun namja (2001) (Bad Guy)
Most (1969) 橋
Zhavoronok (1964) 鬼戰車
The Usual Suspects (1994)
Shuang-Qi-Zhen daoke (1991) (雙旗鎮刀客)
A Better Tomorrow Ying hung boon sik (1986) 英雄本色
A zori zdes tikhie (1972) (這里黎明靜悄悄 The dawns here are quiet)
C'era una volta il West (1968) (Once upon a time in the west)
Da hong deng long gao gao gua (1991) 大紅燈籠高高掛
High Noon (1952)
Ballada o soldate (1959) (Ballad of a soldier)
Sai yau gei: Dai yat baak ling yat wui ji - Yut gwong bou haap (A Chinese Odyssey parts 1&2 西游記之月光寶盒,仙履奇緣)
Kill Bill: Vol. 1 (2003)
Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964)
Il buono, il brutto, il cattivo. (1966) (the good, the bad and the ugly)
Ivanovo detstvo (1962) (the childhood of ivan)
Memento (2000)
Short Circuit (1986)
Zwartboek (2006) (Black Book)
Telmisseomding (1999) (Tell me something)
Tian mi mi (1996)
Paths of Glory (1957)
Das Boot (1981)
La dolce vita (1960)
Kagemusha (1980)
Se, jie (2007) (Lust, Caution 色 戒)
Bin-jip (2004) (3-iron)


pictures from culture revolution

For more pictures see here.


Internet "terrorism" in HK

Please see this for details. For the full story, see Hoiking blog, he said everything I wanted to say.

(update: see also tkma blog)


  • 互聯網是自由媒介,所有網民都享有言論和思想自由,不容干涉。
  • 思想和言論自由,是香港社會的基石。網上網下,我輩都有責任好好維護這個權利。
  • 反對一切防礙網絡自由的行為,包括:
  1. 壓制甚至禁止反對意見
  2. 利用軟/硬手段,甚至恐嚇,去令反對聲音消失。




I would add one more point. In this blog, I would not even delete comments that disagree with me, even if they are stupid or absurd. The only comments I would delete are spam (e.g. wow gold link spams).

It is this simple, here we want to ensure

1) Freedom of expression

2) Freedom of choice to remain "anonymous" in the internet

The curious case of gender imbalance in Hong Kong

This chart is from an old post in Simonworld (where are you now Simon?).

It does not need much explanation. In 1990 There were more male than female across all age groups (till around 60 when men begin to die a lot faster). By 2005 (15 years later) the females outnumbered males VERY significantly.

For more critical minds, one cannot help but ask the question, how could there be so large a change in such a short time span? We are talking about a change from -7% to +33% in the 35-39 age group! i.e. in 1990 there are 107 men for every 100 women, 15 years later, it is 67 vs 100.

It must not be a result of "natural process". In fact, the female:male ratio at birth has been at a fairly stable 49:51 throughout the 1960s, and grew to 48:52 by 1980s and stabilized through this date (i suspect a small amount of selective abortion led to this rise), according to HK Government Census (you need to download excel format to see all the yearly data).

Another evidence that this is a "non-natural" process is revealed by the 35-39 cohort data in 2005, who were 20-24 in 1990, for every 100 men there were 96 women in 1990 but 133 in 2005! Where did these 37 people come from?

Well, it must be non-natural, which is immigration - emigration - death.

Death rate is small for younger age (typically under 1% as we can safely assume). Since one does not need to give up the residency in Hong Kong, emigration has no impact on HK ID card holder (but I am not exactly sure about this, which depends on the definition of the census). The reason must be deal to NET immigration.

How could this happen? Well, the most likely cause is, HK men married women from outside HK (mainly from mainland China). Therefore, if you read from news that it is a lot less likely for HK ladies to find a husband locally because of the gender imbalance, don't believe it. They are either confused or lying. The fact is: because HK men chose not to marry HK women (for various reasons), therefore there is a gender imbalance. The imbalance is not a cause to whatever phenomenon, it is merely a RESULT. Because of this choice by some men in HK, the gender ratio became imbalance. This is a significant difference. Kong girls cannot find a husband not because there are more Kong girls than Kong guys, but because Kong guys enlarged their target geographically while Kong girls did not (as much).

If one has the gender split of HK's immigration data, the myth of the gender imbalance would be easy to solve. Since I couldn't find such data, I had to do some calculation on my own. I took the population of each gender in an age group, e.g. 10-14, in 1991, "age them" by 5 year and compare with the age group 15-19 in 1996, and so on. The I calculated the % non-natural growth for each gender cohort for the years 1981-2006 (in 5 year increment). Finally I calculated the difference in these % non-natural growth. A high difference % means there is a significant difference in the non-natural growth (net immigration) between the two genders.

This is what I found.
(detailed calculation and related data (download from HK Census site) are here)

From the table, it is easy to see that the non-natural growth of female over male is much higher in the 20-40 age group. In fact, between 1991 to 2006 non-natural growth of female is higher than that of male at from 10.4% to 17.6% in the 20-30 age group.

(there are some other % that can be explained plausibly. e.g. the % in older age also shows a similar pattern, but that is because females live longer than male and therefore the base population of female is much higher, for 85+ group in 2006, female: male is 68:32. It is then not difficult to understand why the death RATE (per year, or per 5 year) for female is much lower than that of male)

p.s. (from commentator) please see pineapple farm's analysis 2 years ago (in chinese), I am basically repeating what he observed. pineapple farm also provided a link to the immigration statistics, which confirmed my hypothesis. You can see, for the 25-34 age group, women outnumbered men by around 10x, at 79499 vs 7940 from 2002 to 2006 (5 years net of 71559). From my calculation, non natural for the 5 year period is 61700 vs -3000, net=64700. The definition my be different as the age group shifts every single year plus there are immigration from other country and death/etc., so my estimate was pretty close.


Tsugaru Strait: Japanese territorial claim is not always "greedy"

In an old post I blogged about Japan's territorial claim. I used this map (above) which shows how "greedy" it was in this respect. Well, "greedy" is a neutral word here. There is nothing wrong with it. Every country does so. China and the several SE Asian countries do so over South China Sea, US/Russia/Canada/Norway/Denmark(Greenland now) all tried to claim as much as they could over the Artic. You want to maximize your own interests before you go to a negotiation table. The only problem is that one often ends up in the situation of forcing oneself into a "non-negotiable" position as it is hard to explain any concession to one's citizen domestically (e.g. India today over the Sino-Indian border, and China at its secrecy over its border negotiation results)

Anyway, I just noticed that Japan's ocean claim is very "restrained" over the strait passages, in particular the Tsugaru Strait (i.e. between Honshu and Hokkaido), and also Tsusima and others. The reason, according to wiki, is quite simple, "Japan's territorial waters extend to three nautical miles (5.6 km) into the strait instead of the usual twelve, reportedly to allow nuclear-armed United States Navy warships and submarines to transit the strait without violating Japan's prohibition against nuclear weapons in its territory.[1]"

以下の図は、特定海域での領海の限界線を表示したものです(濃青色は内水を、青色は領海を 表しています)。For maps below, deep blue="internal water", blue=claimed sea border. I am not sure the technical difference between them though.

Soya (north of Hokkaido - subcumbed to USSR/Russian pressure and presence at Kuril)

Oosumi (South of Kyushu - facilitate US fleet passage)

Tsusima (Japan/Korea passage - facilitate US fleet passage)

Tsugaru (facilitate US fleet passage)

This is, of course, a product of the cold war and of the post-WWII situation of Japan, as a conquered state. Given time, Japan would like to normalize it, to at least the "normal" twelve nautical miles (and it is fair for it to do so).

The maps come from a post I found recently, commenting on a report that Chinese navy ships passing the Tsugaru strait late last year. Perhaps China wants US to respond to this, given the incidents of American spy planes and boats over the "international waters" just off Hainan on the edge of China's waters. America has been very silent on this event.
  • 中国戦闘艦の津軽海峡通過の意味






Lucky whale, for escaping the fate of ending up on the sushi bar, or shall I say smart whale, for pretending to be a sub (pun)?


Guo Jia (v) / 奉孝与隆中对


其实战略思维的最高境界还是“不战而屈人之兵”。而这也是罗贯中三国演义的中心战略思想所在。当然“不战”是理想的状况,不过战略应用的最终目标还是如何以最低的代价获得最高的成果。(Strategy is all about leveraging external resources.) 而战略(strategy)和战术(tactic)的区别则在于战略是全盘全局而且是长远的,而且不同的战略选择之间的区别是质的而非量的区别。

回到郭嘉,熟悉三国的都知道曹操赤壁之战后的一句名言,“若奉孝在,决不使吾有此大失也!” 对于曹操为何如此怀念郭奉孝,一直都只想到表面的解释,比如郭嘉聪明、诤谏、受到曹的信任、等等。奉孝顶多是让曹操避免失败而已,也不一定会有制胜之道吧。




1)郭嘉锦囊“今闻袁熙、袁尚往投辽东,明公切不可加兵。公孙康久畏袁氏吞并,二袁 往投必疑。若以兵击之,必并力迎敌,急不可下;若缓之,公孙康、袁氏必自相图: 其势然也。”


3) 原文

三國演義 第三十三回 曹丕乘乱纳甄氏 郭嘉遗计定辽东

... 操回至易州,重赏先曾谏者, 因谓众将曰:“孤前者乘危远征,侥幸成功。虽得胜,天所佑也,不可以为法。诸 君之谏,乃万安之计,是以相赏。后勿难言。”操到易州时,郭嘉已死数日,停柩 在公廨。操往祭之,大哭曰:“奉孝死,乃天丧吾也!”回顾众官曰:“诸君年齿 皆孤等辈,惟奉孝最少,吾欲托以后事,不期中年夭折,使吾心肠崩裂矣!”嘉之 左右,将嘉临死所封之书呈上,曰:“郭公临亡,亲笔书此,嘱曰:‘丞相若从书 中所言,辽东事定矣。’”操拆书视之,点头嗟叹,诸人皆不知其意。

次日,夏侯 dun引众人禀曰:“辽东太守公孙康久不宾服,今袁熙、袁尚又往投之,必为后患。 不如乘其未动,速往征之,辽东可得也。”操笑曰:“不烦诸公虎威,数日之后, 公孙康自送二袁之首至矣。”诸将皆不肯信。   

却 说袁熙、袁尚引数千骑奔辽东。辽东太守公孙康,本襄平人,武威将军公孙 度之子也。当日知袁熙、袁尚来投,遂聚本部属官商议此事。公孙恭曰:“袁绍在 日,尝有吞辽东之心。今袁熙、袁尚兵败将亡,无处依栖,来此相投,是鸠夺鹊巢 之意也。若容纳之,后必相图;不如赚入城中杀之,献头与曹公,曹公必重待我。” 康曰:“只怕曹操引兵下辽东,又不如纳二袁使为我助。”恭曰:“可使人探听: 如曹兵来攻,则留二袁;如其不动,则杀二袁,送与曹公。”康从之,使人去探消 息。   

却说袁熙、袁尚至辽东,二袁密议曰:“辽东军数 万骑,足可与曹操争衡。今 暂投之,后当杀公孙康而夺其地,养成气力而抗中原,可复河北也。”商议已定, 乃入见公孙康。康留于馆驿,只推有病,不即相见。不一日,细作回报:“曹操兵 屯易州,并无下辽东之意。”公孙康大喜,乃先伏刀斧手于壁衣中,使二袁入。相 见礼毕,命坐。时天气严寒,尚见床榻上无●褥,谓康曰:“愿铺坐席。”康目 言曰:“汝二人之头,将行万里,何席之有!”尚大惊。康叱曰:“左右何不下手!” 刀斧手拥出,就坐席上砍下二人之头,用木匣盛贮,使人送到易州来见曹操。时操 在易州,按兵不动。夏侯dun、张辽入禀曰:“如不下辽东,可回许都,恐刘表生心。” 操曰:“待二袁首级至,即便回兵。”众皆暗笑。

忽报辽东公孙康遣人送袁熙、袁 尚首级至,众皆大惊。使者呈上书信,操大笑曰:“不出奉孝之料!”重赏来使, 封公孙康为襄平侯、左将军。众官问曰:“何为不出奉孝之所料?”操遂出郭嘉书 以示之。书略曰:     
今闻袁熙、袁尚往投辽东,明公切不可加兵。公孙康久畏袁氏吞并,二袁 往投必疑。若以兵击之,必并力迎敌,急不可下;若缓之,公孙康、袁氏必自相图: 其势然也。
众皆踊跃称善。操引众官复设祭于郭嘉灵前。亡年三十八岁,从征伐十有一年,多 立奇勋。

4) 三国志

郭嘉字奉孝,颍川阳翟人也。傅子曰:嘉少有远量。汉末天下将乱。自弱冠匿名迹,密交结英隽,不与俗接,故时人多莫知,惟识达者奇之。年二十七,辟司徒府。初, 北见袁绍,谓绍谋臣辛评、郭图曰:“夫智者审于量主,故百举百全而功名可立也。袁公徒欲效周公之下士,而未知用人之机。多端寡要,好谋无决,欲与共济天下 大难,定霸王之业,难矣!”于是遂去之。先是时,颍川戏志才,筹画士也,太祖甚器之。早卒。太祖与荀彧书曰:“自志才亡后,莫可与计事者。汝、颍固多奇 士,谁可以继之?” 彧荐嘉。召见,论天下事。太祖曰:“使孤成大业者,必此人也。”嘉出,亦喜曰:“真吾主也。”表为司空军祭酒。傅 子曰:太祖谓嘉曰:“本初拥冀州之众,青、并从之,地广兵强,而数为不逊。吾欲讨之,力不敌,如何?”对曰:“刘、项之不敌,公所知也。汉祖唯智胜;项羽 虽强,终为所禽。嘉窃料之,绍有十败,公有十胜,虽兵强,无能为也。绍繁礼多仪,公体任自然,此道胜一也。绍以逆动,公奉顺以率天下,此义胜二也。汉末政 失于宽,绍以宽济宽,故不摄,公纠之以猛而上下知制,此治胜三也。绍外宽内忌,用人而疑之,所任唯亲戚子弟,公外易简而内机明,用人无疑,唯才所宜,不间 远近,此度胜四也。绍多谋少决,失在后事,公策得辄行,应变无穷,此谋胜五也。绍因累世之资,高议揖让以收名誉,士之好言饰外者多归之,公以至心待人,推 诚而行,不为虚美,以俭率下,与有功者无所吝,士之忠正远见而有实者皆原为用,此德胜六也。绍见人饥寒,恤念之形于颜色,其所不见,虑或不及也,所谓妇人 之仁耳,公于目前小事,时有所忽,至于大事,与四海接,恩之所加,皆过其望,虽所不见,虑之所周,无不济也,此仁胜七也。绍大臣争权,谗言惑乱,公御下以 道,浸润不行,此明胜八也。绍是非不可知,公所是进之以礼,所不是正之以法,此文胜九也。绍好为虚势,不知兵要,公以少克众,用兵如神,军人恃之,敌人畏 之,此武胜十也。”太祖笑曰:“如卿所言,孤何德以堪之也!”嘉又曰:“绍方北击公孙瓒,可因其远征,东取吕布。不先取布,若绍为寇,布为之援,此深害 也。”太祖曰:“然。”

征吕布,三战破之,布退固守。时士卒疲倦,太祖欲引军还,嘉说太祖急攻之,遂禽布。语在荀攸传。傅 子曰:太祖欲引军还,嘉曰:“昔项籍七十馀战,未尝败北,一朝失势而身死国亡者,恃勇无谋故也。今布每战辄破,气衰力尽,内外失守。布之威力不及项籍,而 困败过之,若乘胜攻之,此成禽也。”太祖曰:“善。”魏书曰:刘备来奔,以为豫州牧。或谓太祖曰:“备有英雄志,今不早图,后必为患。”太祖以问嘉,嘉 曰:“有是。然公提剑起义兵,为百姓除暴,推诚仗信以招俊杰,犹惧其未也。今备有英雄名,以穷归己而害之,是以害贤为名,则智士将自疑,回心择主,公谁与 定天下?夫除一人之患,以沮四海之望,安危之机,不可不察!”太祖笑曰:“君得之矣。”傅子曰:初,刘备来降,太祖以客礼待之,使为豫州牧。嘉言于太祖 曰:“备有雄才而甚得众心。张飞、关羽者,皆万人之敌也,为之死用。嘉观之,备终不为人下,其谋未可测也。古人有言:‘一日纵敌,数世之患。’宜早为之 所。”是时,太祖奉天子以号令天下,方招怀英雄以明大信,未得从嘉谋。会太祖使备要击袁术,嘉与程昱俱驾而谏太祖曰:“放备,变作矣!”时备已去,遂举兵 以叛。太祖恨不用嘉之言。案魏书所云,与傅子正反也。

孙策转斗千里,尽有江东,闻太祖与袁绍相持于官渡,将渡江北袭许。众闻皆惧,嘉料之曰:“策新并江东,所诛皆英豪雄杰,能得人死力者也。然策轻而无备,虽有百万之众,无异于独行中原也。若刺客伏起,一人之敌耳。以吾观之,必死于匹夫之手。”策临江未济,果为许贡客所杀。傅 子曰:太祖欲速征刘备,议者惧军出,袁绍击其后,进不得战而退失所据。语在武纪。太祖疑,以问嘉。嘉劝太祖曰:“绍性迟而多疑,来必不速。备新起,众心未 附,急击之必败。此存亡之机,不可失也。”太祖曰:“善。”遂东征备。备败奔绍,绍果不出。臣松之案武纪,决计征备,量绍不出,皆出自太祖。此云用嘉计, 则为不同。又本传称(自)嘉料孙策轻佻,必死于匹夫之手,诚为明于见事。然自非上智,无以知其死在何年也。今正以袭许年死,此盖事之偶合。

从破袁绍,绍死,又从讨谭、尚于黎阳,连战数克。诸将欲乘胜遂攻之,嘉曰:“袁绍爱此二子,莫适立也。有郭图、逢纪为之谋臣,必交斗其间,还相离 也。急之则相持,缓之而后争心生。不如南向荆州若征刘表者,以待其变;变成而后击之,可一举定也。”太祖曰:“善。”乃南征。军至西平,谭、尚果争冀州。 谭为尚军所败,走保平原,遣辛毗乞降。太祖还救之,遂从定邺。又从攻谭于南皮,冀州平。封嘉洧阳亭侯。傅子曰:河北既平,太祖多辟召青、冀、幽、并知名之士,渐臣使之,以为省事掾属。皆嘉之谋也。

太祖将征袁尚及三郡乌丸,诸下多惧刘表使刘备袭许以讨太祖,嘉曰:“公虽威震天下,胡恃其远,必不设备。因其无备,卒然击之,可破灭也。且袁绍有恩 于民夷,而尚兄弟生存。今四州之民,徒以威附,德施未加,舍而南征,尚因乌丸之资,招其死主之臣,胡人一动,民夷俱应,以生蹋顿之心,成觊觎之计,恐青、 冀非己之有也。表,坐谈客耳,自知才不足以御备,重任之则恐不能制,轻任之则备不为用,虽虚国远征,公无忧矣。”太祖遂行。至易,嘉言曰:“兵贵神速。今 千里袭人,辎重多,难以趣利,且彼闻之,必为备;不如留辎重,轻兵兼道以出,掩其不意。”太祖乃密出卢龙塞,直指单于庭。虏卒闻太祖至,惶怖合战。大破 之,斩蹋顿及名王已下。尚及兄熙走辽东。

嘉深通有算略,达于事情。太祖曰:“唯奉孝为能知孤意。”年三十八,自柳城还,疾笃,太祖问疾者交错。及薨,临其丧,哀甚,谓荀攸等曰:“诸君年皆 孤辈也,唯奉孝最少。天下事竟,欲以后事属之,而中年夭折,命也夫!”乃表曰:“军祭酒郭嘉,自从征伐,十有一年。每有大议,临敌制变。臣策未决,嘉辄成 之。平定天下,谋功为高。不幸短命,事业未终。追思嘉勋,实不可忘。可增邑八百户,并前千户。”魏 书载太祖表曰:“臣闻褒忠宠贤,未必当身,念功惟绩,恩隆后嗣。是以楚宗孙叔,显封厥子;岑彭既没,爵及支庶。故军祭酒郭嘉,忠良渊淑,体通性达。每有大 议,发言盈庭,执中处理,动无遗策。自在军旅,十有馀年,行同骑乘,坐共幄席,东禽吕布,西取眭固,斩袁谭之首,平朔土之众,逾越险塞,荡定乌丸,震威辽 东,以枭袁尚。虽假天威,易为指麾,至于临敌,发扬誓命,凶逆克殄,勋实由嘉。方将表显,短命早终。上为朝廷悼惜良臣,下自毒恨丧失奇佐。宜追增嘉封,并 前千户,褒亡为存,厚往劝来也。”谥曰贞侯。子奕嗣。魏书称奕通达见理。奕字伯益,见王昶家诫。

后太祖征荆州还,于巴丘遇疾疫,烧船,叹曰:“郭奉孝在,不使孤至此。”傅子曰:太祖又云:“哀哉奉孝!痛哉奉孝!惜哉奉孝!”初,陈群非嘉不治行检,数廷诉嘉,嘉意自若。太祖愈益重之,然以群能持正,亦悦焉。傅 子曰:太祖与荀彧书,追伤嘉曰:“郭奉孝年不满四十,相与周旋十一年,阻险艰难,皆共罹之。又以其通达,见世事无所凝滞,欲以后事属之,何意卒尔失之,悲 痛伤心。今表增其子满千户,然何益亡者,追念之感深。且奉孝乃知孤者也;天下人相知者少,又以此痛惜。奈何奈何!”又与彧书曰:“追惜奉孝,不能去心。其 人见时事兵事,过绝于人。又人多畏病,南方有疫,常言‘吾往南方,则不生还’。然与共论计,云当先定荆。此为不但见计之忠厚,必欲立功分,弃命定。事人心 乃尔,何得使人忘之!”奕为太子文学,早薨。子深嗣。深薨,子猎嗣。世语曰:嘉孙敞,字泰中,有才识,位散骑常侍。